the paradox of “real but fragile”
by Stefan Koski
Published: July 29, 2008
When 2006 was drawing to a close, even Bush’s national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, was saying that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, was completely impotent as far as being able to accomplish anything in the country. Violence in Iraq was at its worse since the initial invasion, and it looked as if troop withdrawals were inevitably going to be added to the presidential agenda.
As we know the opposite turned out to be true. The situation in Iraq meant that we needed to send more troops to the region. Bush wasn’t about to cut his losses and admit defeat.
Now that the security situation in Iraq has greatly improved over recent months and violence is at its lowest since the invasion began, does that mean that we can begin withdrawing troops?
Well, yes - but only back to pre-surge levels. The popular way of wording the security gains in Iraq is to say they are “real, but fragile.” No phrase is more ambiguous (and few more misleading) than saying security gains are real and yet fragile.
A fragile security gain is a borderline paradox. It is either safer in Iraq or it is not safer in Iraq. Saying security gains are real but fragile suggests that they are, in fact, completely fictitious.
Or put another way, the security gains that have been made are not within the control of U.S. troops. Adding the “but fragile” part to the phrase allows some wiggle room for those who use it, in case the security situation suddenly changes for the worse. If you’re not even sure of whether things are going to get better or worse in the near future, then it’s clear that you’re not the one in charge of the outcome.
While the security situation in Iraq has improved by nearly every measure, many of the factors behind those improvements are not linked to the presence of American soldiers or counter-insurgency tactics.
One of those factors is the U.S.-funded Sons of Iraq program, which pays 100,000 Sunni militiamen to be an active security force in their towns and villages. This certainly has improved the security situation in those areas, but these militias aren’t integrated into the official (currently Shi’ite-controlled) Iraqi government security forces. That’s 100,000 guys with guns who aren’t shooting anyone at the moment because we’re paying them not to. The “but fragile” part could prove prophetic if and when the U.S. government stops paying them.
Another factor behind the decrease in violence is the cease-fire that Moqtada al-Sadr has ordered since last August. His Shi’ite militia might be lying low at the moment, but they’re as equally well-armed and capable of inciting violence anew as the Sons of Iraq. Proof of this was provided in ample supply last March when Maliki initiated an offensive in Basra against al-Sadr’s forces, which resulted in a spectacular burst of bloodshed. Notably, the cease-fire that was signed between Maliki and al-Sadr allowed al-Sadr’s militiamen to keep their weapons.
Many politicians, especially John McCain, have touted the success of the surge in Iraq as the greatest sign of progress. While its success should not be discounted, it’s important to remember that while progress will require improved security, improved security is not necessarily a sign of progress. “Real but fragile” security gains are worthless. What is needed are real security gains. Period.
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August 2nd, 2008 at 2:14 am
Koski, good medicine for those praising the surge.
August 12th, 2008 at 4:46 pm
I disagree.
Real but fragile is a valid assesment of the situation in Iraq. When I hear the phrase “real but fragile” to me it means, “We have made significant gains in Iraq and those will be permanent as long as Congress doesn’t stop funding the war, as long as arbitrary time tables aren’t set, and as long as the next president doesn’t undo our success by caving to extremist voters.”
Given the current political climate in America, those are valid concerns and would not be the fault of either the current administration or Iraq’s government.
So yeah, our gains in Iraq are “real but fragile.” Let’s not mess this up.
August 13th, 2008 at 9:36 am
Actually, the point I was trying to make was that the security situation (at the moment) largely hinges on factors that are not within our control. But what you’re saying does make sense. From the Republican perspective, forces that are not within their control could also be taken to mean Democrats and the voting public.
I wouldn’t call such people “extremists” though. I save that kind of word for people who want to bleed the country dry by spending an endless amount of money to propagate a war that goes on forever.
August 13th, 2008 at 11:20 am
There is no doubt we will be attacked again if we pull out. Terrorists will declare Jihad again and again against the world. They attack not only america, but many countries across the globe. So, my question is…do you want another attack on our soil? Because it will happen if we pull out.
August 13th, 2008 at 12:15 pm
Nicholas, your argument is absurd, and you have no evidence to support it. In case you haven’t noticed, terrorists have attacked other countries regardless of the fact that we are occupying Iraq; in Madrid in 2004, in London in 2005.
If anything, the Iraq War has sparked more terrorism globally:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/how-the-war-on-terror-made-the-world-a-more-terrifying-place-438190.html
Not to mention that I find your use of Straw Man tactics to debase my position to be utterly insulting.
August 13th, 2008 at 12:22 pm
Stefan, research the jihadist history. They want to restore the caliphate and rule the world once again. They accomplish this by using terrorism. Also, look at our past attacks. They happened because we were on the defense. Now, we are on the offense, making sure we wont be attacked. The reason why we arent being attacked is because we are fighting this war. The reason other countries are being attacked is because they are doing what we were doing before 9/11…waiting to be attacked.
Its time to do something about global terrorism and not let israel, a country the size of delaware to combat GLOBAL terrorism for everybody else.
August 13th, 2008 at 1:21 pm
I am very familiar with the origins of the jihad and the history of the various caliphates that have ruled the Middle East in the past. Al-Qaeda’s ultimate goal is to destroy the “American Empire” and create a new caliphate. I don’t understand what (if anything) this has to do with Iraq. Al-Qaeda is based in Afghanistan. It was in Afghanistan on 9/11, and it is still fighting in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, or Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia as it is sometimes called, is a completely separate entity that was formed in response to the U.S. invasion and occupation. They share some ideological similarities to Al-Qaeda, but they are otherwise completely unconnected.
As for being on the offensive rather than the defensive, you ignored the fact that both Spain and Great Britain are (or were, in the case of Spain) part of the coalition of the willing and sent troops to Iraq. Great Britain, you seem to forget, is the country with the second largest number of troops in Iraq besides us. They were both attacked in spite of being “on the offensive,” so that argument is nonsense.
I believe the reason why we haven’t been attacked since 9/11 is because of solid intelligence and good police work which uncovers and foils terrorist plots before they are able to be put into action.
All of this aside, I never said that we shouldn’t combat global terrorism, and I never said anything about leaving it up to Israel. The terrorists that attacked us on 9/11 are in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That should be our priority. Not Iraq.
August 13th, 2008 at 1:58 pm
Stefan, who are you kidding here? Britain had 7000 troops compared to US’ 130,000. The reason we are succeeding is because of the surge. We are driving away al qaeda, killing more and more of their key leaders and weakening them. Yes, i agree with you that our CIA is a major factor with regards to the reason why we havnt been attacked since 9/11, but our troops there are a major factor too.
Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship provided headquarters, operating bases, training camps, and other support to terrorist groups. Iraqi militants trained in Taliban-run Afghanistan helped Ansar al-Islam, an Islamist militia based in a lawless part of northeast Iraq. Iraq was harboring a terrorist cell led by Abu Musab Zarqawi, a suspected al-Qaeda affiliate and chemical and biological weapons specialist. Moreover, Iraq has hosted several Palestinian splinter groups that oppose peace with Israel , including the mercenary Abu Nidal Organization, whose leader, Abu Nidal, was found dead in Baghdad in August 2002. Iraq has also supported the Islamist Hamas movement and reportedly channeled money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. Do you know how many sunni terrorists there are in iraq?
August 13th, 2008 at 5:42 pm
I’m not kidding anyone. Your argument was that being on the defensive instead of on the offensive was the reason why Spain and Great Britain were the target of terrorist attacks. I pointed out that they weren’t on the defensive. Simple as that. It has nothing to do with the surge, troop numbers, or anything else.
Since you brought that up though, let me reiterate the point I was trying to make with this article. The surge has helped to quell violence. Why wouldn’t it? More troops on the ground means less violence in the streets, just as having more cops on the beat would translate to a drop in crime. The surge isn’t the only factor in play though. People like al-Sadr are lying low, but he’s still armed and ready. The Sons of Iraq are on the U.S. payroll at the moment, but they won’t be forever. These are issues that still remain at large, and as far as I can tell, very little is being done to address them. That’s why security gains are “real but fragile.” They could easily reverse at any moment, which means they aren’t so “real” after all.
How many Sunni terrorists are in Iraq? Depends on your definition of terrorist. If you’re talking about Al-Qaeda in Iraq, almost none. They’ve lost the backing of the Sunni population during the Anbar Awakening and they’ve been hunted down by U.S. counter-insurgency teams. They never made up more that 3% of the Sunni population in Iraq to begin with, and the Sunni population is itself a minority in Iraq, so I don’t know how much it means to whittling down a little to almost none amounts to. Certainly it’s an accomplishment, and an important one at that, but they were never (repeat: never) the biggest critical threat out there. And as I already said, Al-Qaeda in Iraq didn’t exist until after the invasion.
If your definition of Sunni terrorist is a Sunni fundamentalist with a gun and a potential ax to grind, I’d say over 100,000. But many of them are paid by the U.S. to protect their local neighborhoods, so they’re not killing anyone at the moment (at least not openly).
All of this doesn’t change the fact that the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 were trained in Afghanistan, and the plan was the brainchild of Osama bin Laden, who is (or was) in Afghanistan. If we’re going to bring Zarqawi into this, it should be pointed out that he never had any ties to Saddam Hussein. Nor was he ever officially part of Al Qaeda. His funding and support came from Iran, not Iraq:
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200607/zarqawi/4
And it doesn’t change that fact that saying the occupation in Iraq is the reason why we haven’t been attacked since 9/11 is pseudo-science which can be neither proven or disproven. It could just as easily be the war in Afghanistan, or increased security measures. By that logic I could say my Adidas are the reason why I haven’t been attacked by a bear yet. It sounds ridiculous, but since I haven’t been attacked by a bear yet, how can you disprove it?
And there certainly is no way you can prove for absolute certain that withdrawing from Iraq will cause another terrorist attack against the United States.
August 13th, 2008 at 7:30 pm
Having a couple thousand troops is not called being on the offense. With that logic, if a fire is dying, you cant just throw in a couple of twigs, you have to go all the way or nothing. It does have to do with the number of troops because you have to have enough troops for there to be the desired effect. An analogy could be in accounting, you must cover your fixed costs before you can make any profit. In the same way, you must have a certain number of troops for there to be any positive effect. Lets say you need 130,000 for the positive effect, having only 80 or 90k troops isnt going to cut it. This is precisely why the surge has been successful. I don’t call having a couple of troops here and there as being on the “offense” and protecting your soil back home.
Security gains are real but fragile? They can be gone any second? With that logic, you are alive right now but could die any second. With our continued presence there, we are strengthening iraqi forces every single day. They will soon be able to manage on their own.
You say “And it doesn’t change that fact that saying the occupation in Iraq is the reason why we haven’t been attacked since 9/11 is pseudo-science which can be neither proven or disproven. It could just as easily be the war in Afghanistan, or increased security measures. By that logic I could say my Adidas are the reason why I haven’t been attacked by a bear yet. It sounds ridiculous, but since I haven’t been attacked by a bear yet, how can you disprove it?”
Your arguement is wrong. We know your addidas is not the reason you are not attacked by a bear because you are not near a bear and should you be near a bear, your addidas will not prevent the bear from eating you alive (try if youd like). In our case, we can say our actions are preventing terrorist attacks because we are weakening terrorist organizations and our CIA, like you said, is also doing a good job.
You say “And there certainly is no way you can prove for absolute certain that withdrawing from Iraq will cause another terrorist attack against the United States.”
Ofcourse I can. Terrorists will continue to attack unless we stop them. And we must stop those who continue to harbor terrorists and fund them.
Saddam Hussein is paying $25,000 to the relatives of Palestinian suicide bombers — a $15,000 raise much welcomed by the bombers’ families. In Tulkarm, one of the poorest towns on the West Bank, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council handed out the checks from Saddam. The payments have been made for at least two years, but the amount has suddenly jumped up by $15,000 — a bonus for the families of martyrs, to reward those taking part in the escalating war against Israel. He also funded the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the Philippines. Saddam Hussein was a longtime state sponsor of terrorism, and during his reign, Iraq was listed by the State Department on the official list of “state sponsors.” Iraq was added to that list in 1990 following its invasion of Kuwait and also for providing bases to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Abu Nidal organization. What exact word or phrase best describes the relations between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and al-Qaeda, as well as other Islamic terror groups, is certainly debatable. What is not debatable, based on the Iraqi Perspectives Project, is that Saddam Hussein’s regime funded, trained, and assisted terrorist groups (including al-Qaeda proxies), and sometimes actually ordered them to attack American citizens, American interests, and American allies. To compound the danger, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was simultaneously using its intelligence and security apparatus to plot and conduct terror attacks of its own.
The most contentious issue regarding Saddam Hussein and terrorism may be the extent to which Saddam supported anti-American terrorist groups (as opposed to his more agreed-upon support for anti-Israeli groups), particularly Islamic terrorist groups. On this topic the report says that Saddam’s animosity towards the United States continued after the first Gulf War, so he reached out to and supported Islamic-fundamentalist and related terrorist organizations that also saw the U.S. as an enemy. Internal Iraqi documents reveal that Saddam’s regime knew it had to keep these relations top secret, due to the increased Western scrutiny that Islamic terrorism began receiving during the 1990s because of Iran’s open support for Hezbollah.
Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al-Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led at one time by bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri) or that generally shared al-Qaeda’s stated goals and objectives.
Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al-Qaeda — as long as that organization’s near-term goals supported Saddam’s long-term vision.
Another document lists an Islamic militant group in Afghanistan as dependent on Iraq for financing, and an Islamic group in Egypt as agreeing to make attacks in exchange for financing and training from Iraq. Saddam’s regime also provided supervision and oversight, as well as 30,000 rifles and 10,000 pistols, to help get a Sudanese terrorist training camp off the ground at a time when anti-American Islamic terror groups were prevalent in the country. According to the report, Saddam’s regime also maintained in-country training camps for all kinds of non-Iraqi groups, many of which were looking to destabilize America’s allies in the Middle East.
Al Qaeda wasnt in iraq until the invasion? Mister, I don’t care where the terrorists are. I find it better that they come to where we are so we can take care of them quicker instead of having to search for them. So Al Qaeda is in iraq now, do we pull back and let them be? No, we should take care of them then and there. Thats precisely what we are doing, killing their terrorists and key leaders.
August 13th, 2008 at 10:30 pm
This is a lot of interesting evidence about Saddam Hussein’s ties to terrorist organizations, but it completely overlooks several important points:
1. Saddam Hussein is dead, and therefore not funding or harboring terrorists anymore.
2. Al-Qaeda is not in Iraq. They never were in Iraq. They are in Afghanistan. And no, it’s not better that they “come to where we are” because that only addresses symptoms of a problem, not the symptoms themselves. You should care where they are because it’s difficult to kill them in a country where they don’t exist. You want to kill key terrorist leaders? I would call Osama bin Laden pretty key, and he’s definitely not in Iraq.
3. The idea that Great Britain and Spain were attacked because they weren’t on the offensive is ridiculous. If anything, they were targeted because they were on the offensive in Iraq. It wouldn’t have mattered how few or how many troops they committed.
4. We’re not preventing a future attack on America by weakening terrorist organizations because the terrorist organization we should be weakening is Al-Qaeda, and they (must I repeat myself?) are not in Iraq. Referring to the article I cited earlier from The Independent, terrorist attacks have been on the upswing since the Iraq War began, so they haven’t been made any weaker because of it.
5. A future terrorist attack is not any less likely because of the occupation of Iraq. You are right in saying terrorists will continue to attack unless we stop those who harbor and fund them. Unfortunately, those terrorists are not in Iraq and they are not funded by Iraq. They are in Lebanon, Gaza, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and they are funded by Syria and Iran. And that’s just off the top of my head.
I really do believe security gains are as fragile as you sarcastically put, and the reason why I believe that is because when Maliki made a move against “criminal elements” in Basra and Sadr City the region exploded in violence overnight. Al-Sadr still commands a well-armed and well-trained militia. His cease-fire contributes to the improved security situation, but that doesn’t mean it will be in place forever. Just like we won’t be paying 100,000 Sunni’s with guns to be impromptu security forces forever.
My point through all of this is that we need more permanent solutions in order to achieve a more permanent security situation. I know you say that we’re strengthening Iraqi forces every day and that soon they will be able to manage on their own, but excuse me for being skeptical. The Bush Administration has been saying that for years.
The reason why I titled this article “the paradox of ‘real but fragile’” is because if the security gains really were real, we wouldn’t need to add the “but fragile” part to the end of it. They would just be real security gains. The reason why they’re not real is due in part because of wild cards like the Sons of Iraq, which are neither loyal nor paid by the central government in Baghdad, and al-Sadr’s paramilitary organization.
August 13th, 2008 at 10:33 pm
Edited to add:
The sentence in number 2 should read, “that only addresses symptoms of a problem, not the problems themselves.”
August 14th, 2008 at 7:29 pm
n regards to al-Qaida in Iraq, their leadership has outlined the end state towards which their propaganda efforts are currently working. Specifically … they seek to portray al-Qaida in Iraq as a legitimate political organization to be viewed as the alternative to the legitimate, duly-elected government of Iraq.
Their primary goal in discrediting the government of Iraq is the expulsion of the U.S. from Iraq in order to remove support for the government of Iraq and impose themselves, al-Qaida in Iraq, as the power.
Detainees have also begun to divulge how al-Qaida in Iraq is attempting to achieve these goals. Al-Qaida in Iraq brings in other foreign fighters and terrorists for the sole purpose of killing innocent Iraqis … They do not care about this nation. Al-Qaida in Iraq encourages Sunni and Shi’a in-fighting and believes a widespread sectarian divide will force the United States into neutrality and ultimately departure. Al Qaeda in Iraq is made up, at this point, of both Sunni Iraqi members and foreigners who made their way to Iraq to wage jihad. It is also considered to have some elements of Ansar Al Islam, a Kurdish Islamist group prominent in the northern area where the original group landed.
Some jihadists were formed to combat the US only so that they could resume their caliphate afterwards. We are preventing them from performing their ultimate goal, spread and wage wars against the world. So, their first goal should be to attack those who are in their immediate way.
Also, sunnis and shiites are fighting because they disagree on nuances of their religion, but they in large agree that they want to restore the caliphate and rule the world.
Actually, al qaeda didnt come to iraq after we did. It happened at the same time. In 2002, after al qaeda forces left TORA BORA, American policy planners were confronted with the dilemma of what to do next. One theory was to follow the policy of war against the terrorists, that is, the perpetrators of 9/11 operation. The other theory was to address the regional threat, which was also seen as global. Iraq was one open door to pursue the war on terror. I like to call the end of the first Gulf war the “unfinished symphony.” It was as an open wound that, if not fixed at the time, would re-open. The Kuirds were put under a no fly zone but isolated and threatened by saddam; the regime massacred the shiites; and saddam was boxed in by UN sanctions, but plotting to free himself and resume his previous strategies. The situation was a status quo that was drifting slowly toward the return of saddam’s power into the region. Had the events of 911 not taken place, i believe that saddam would have reconquiered and oppressed iraqs oppressed ethnicities. moreover, projecting events based on the logic that “jihad fills a void” leads to a frightening conclusion: saddam’s iraq was converging with al qaeda and was heading to link up with iran, syria, and sudan. and more importantly saddam would have redeveloped his WMDs from scratch. the return of the flow of oil dollars, a devil’s alliance with damascus and tehran, the collapse of the UN monitering system, and the spread of jihad would have projected iraq into the center of the emerging regional bloc. the ammerican decision to go to war in iraq used arguements from pre-911 lexicon simply b/c the national and international context was not politically liberated. Powell stated at the UN that the reasons for invading iraq were first, wmds, second, links to al qaeda, and third, human rights abuses. in reality, powell was not wrong. analytical projections would have established these threats as real, but only when viewed through a prism of the global jihadist threat and strategies. the ameican public and international public opinion were not educated as to the nature of the long-term threat. hence, it was almost impossible for the US administation to build arguements that national and international constintuencies could understand. however, another door was there: human rights and genocide. BY simply reversing the order of arguements, the US administration could made a solid case. As with yugoslavia, the main issue in iraq was the massacre of the shiites and the kurds. powell should have focused on the genocide in iraq, growing links to terror, and the potential threat of wmds.
But as the intervention developed and as the US wa rebuffed on the wmds question, the american human right arguement surfaced as solid. hence, in the process of liberating iraq and helping its civil society to establish democracy, the thuird arguement now takes center stage, by the power and intentions of the iraqis themselves. and with the hanuary 30, 2005 deadline for elections met, the leading drive for the US-led iraq campaign is now advanced democracy. So, US strategy was initially to fight terror in its own region, theregore removing one threat at a time, starting with the most dangerous in the sense of future threat: that was the rationale for taking out saddam. But once successful, the project shifted to democracy building as a longterm stratgy to counter future jihad terror.
On the other side of the conflict, al qaeda projected that the US was moving forward to remove saddam as of 2002. Bin laden decided to move into iraqi battlefield even BEFORE the US-led coalition invaded. Byb february 11, 2003, his troops were ready for the post-saddam era. On april 15, jihadists rose up in iraq, and weeks later they launched the fallujah operation. Al zarqawi became the coordinator of their activities as soon as the Baath party collapsed.
From a geopolitical perspective, both the US and jihadists viewed iraq as a battlefield. Both got there at the same time, both had allies waiting, both had to fight for its future - the US to allow iraq’s civil society to build a democracy, and the jihadists to establish a Wahabi terrorist state. The two strategies can be expected to clash in iraq as long as the global war on terror lasts. The freedom stratgy of the US was able to establsh a space for iraqi-democracy; the jihadi stratgyu was able to muster all its resources to block the latter, with unprecedented violance bu without great success.
In comparing the strategies of the jihadists to those of the US, you can see that US freed itself from the paralysis of the 1990s by striking back in afghanistan, building a homeland security structure, and establishing an international cooperation with other govts. The jihadists lost one launching pad in afghanistan ut have restructured worldwide to generate a number of “afghanistans” and engage the US in as many battlefields as possible. US strategies are now centering on “offensive” mode to preempt terrorist action, and i totally agree with it.