the caveat to the surge
by Stefan Koski
Published: April 1, 2008
“The surge is working” has been the phrase of the hour for every Republican politician for the last five or six months. But no matter how much the situation on the ground has improved in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq, there should be an important addendum to that statement:
“The surge is working - as long as al-Sadr lets it work.”
In all the news reports and statements about how the surge in American troops has helped make Iraq safer, one crucial detail is often left out, or if it is mentioned it’s only in passing, almost like an afterthought. That detail is the fact that Moqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army, declared a unilateral ceasefire last August. That alone has been the reason behind much of the decrease in violence.
Just how much of the decrease the ceasefire had allowed readily became apparent last week when Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki decided to launch a major military offensive against “criminal elements” in Basra. In truth the offensive was a crusade against Sadr’s Shi’ite militiamen in all but name.
As soon as he did the phrase “the surge is working” became absurdly optimistic, if not an outright lie. All at once Basra was inundated in gun battles that claimed well over a hundred lives in a matter of a few days. The fighting became so intense that al-Maliki asked for U.S. and British air support to try to gain control of the situation (which they provided). Meanwhile, Baghdad experienced a slew of protest marches, suicide bombers, car bombs, armed kidnappings and open fighting in the streets, requiring a massive police crackdown and a citywide curfew.
And at the end of all this conflict, who emerged victorious? Al-Maliki got the upper hand in the war of words when he called al-Sadr’s men “worse then al-Qaeda,” but in every other way al-Sadr came out on top. Militants refused to give up their weapons as al-Maliki had originally intended, not even for cash. In negotiating a ceasefire with al-Sadr that allowed the militants to retain their weapons, al-Maliki not only failed at both destroying and disarming the Mahdi Army, but he also undermined his original line about fighting “criminal elements” in Basra that were unconnected to the Mahdi Army.
More importantly, the violence stopped only when al-Sadr ordered it to stop. He came out looking calm and in control, whereas al-Maliki has proven the weakness of the central government in Baghdad and its inability to deal with large armed groups opposed to it.
Supporters of the surge in Iraq may have been ambivalent about the militias that haven’t been in open conflict with U.S. soldiers over the last year, but this incident proves that as long as there is a well-armed militia under al-Sadr’s command prepared to fight both the central government and the U.S., Iraq will never be truly secure.
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